Debian GNU/Linux security checklist and hardening

[sth0r@shawn-fortress]$ uname -a
Linux shawn-fortress 3.7-trunk-686-pae #1 SMP Debian 3.7.2-0+kali8 i686 GNU/Linux
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-----=[ D O   N O T   F U C K   W I T H   A   H A C K E R ]=-----=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=------------------------[ #5 File 0x02 ]-------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=----=[ Debian GNU/Linux security checklist and hardening ]=------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-------------------=[ By Shawn the R0ck   ]=---------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-------------------=[ Update: Apr 8 2015 ]=----------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------=|

-- [ CONTENTS

  1. About this doc
  2. Security updates
  3. Vulnerability Assessment
    2.1 GCC mitigation
    2.2 0ld sch00l *nix file auditing
    2.3 GNU/Linux’s auditd
    2.4 T00ls
  4. Kernel security
    3.1 Apparmor
    3.2 SELinux
    3.3 Mempo kernel
    3.3.1 PaX/Grsecurity
  5. SSL/TLS Checklist
    4.1 Ciphersuites in Apache2/Nginx
  6. PHP
  7. Weirdo audit
  8. Reference

-- [ 0. About this documentation

GNU/Linux already become one of most important fundamental element in modern IT platform. Almost every important applications heavily rely on the core component of GNU system: GCC, Glibc and linux kernel. GNU/Linux is totally free/libre and open source software( FLOSS). Many people thinks free/libre and open source software is secure because its open to many eyes. Yes, that’s true. According to Coverity’s report:

http://developers.slashdot.org/story/14/04/16/2021227/code-quality-open-source-vs-proprietary

The source code quality of FLOSS project are better than closed software systems. But the FLOSS is not unbreakable. This documentation is going to discuss something we should know about GNU/Linux security operations. These examples in this doc has been tested only on Debian GNU/Linux 7.5

-- [ 1. Security update

Follow the minimal installation principle: Debian is providing mini installation iso.

To check which packages need security updates:

#sudo apt-get upgrade -s | grep -i security

-- [ 2. Vulnerability Assessment

Know your GNU/Linux system as your enemy does. Your enmey might hide in the shadow and watch and learn the ways you’ve been using the system. As a defender, some philosophical ideas( thanks to Bruce Schneier) should be kept in mind:

https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2000/04/the_process_of_secur.html


Security is NOT:
* Security is NOT installing a firewall
* Security is NOT a Product or Service
* Security is Not a Product; It’s a Process

Security is:
* Security is a Process, Methodology, Costs, Policies and People
* Security is only as good as your “weakest link”
* Security is 24x7x365 … constantly ongoing .. never ending


A security system is only as strong as its weakest link. Defense-in-depth seems the only option we have. You should be the best professional paranoia and also need a proper threat model. “Who’s gonna attack your system” would be daily bread for your mind;-)

---- [ 2.1 GCC mitigation

setuid binaries are highly risks if the program had the bug that can be exploitable. The setuid binaries should be protected under GCC’s mitigation. We only examine 4 mitigation options here:

http://phrack.org/archives/issues/67/13.txt ( some GCC mitigation description from one Phrack paper, thanks pi3..dude, did I owe you a beer?)

*) NX

This feature can prevent shellcode execution on the stack. This mechanism can be implemented by hardware or software emulation. Take a look:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NX_bit

In GCC’s options, NX is enable by default. If you want to turn it off, use “-z execstack”. Check method:

shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ readelf -l a.out | grep GNU_STACK
GNU_STACK 0x000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x000000 0x000000 RW 0x8

*) Stack canaries (canaries of the death)

This is a compiler mechanism, in contrast to previously kernel-based described techniques. When a function is called, the code inserted by the compiler in its prologue stores a special value (the so-called cookie) on the stack before the metadata. This value is a kind of defender of sensitive data. During the epilogue the stack value is compared with the original one and if they are not the same then a memory corruption must have occurred. The program is then killed and this situation is reported in the system logs. Details about technical implementation and little arm race between protection and bypassing protection in this area will be explained further.
GCC options:

-fno-stack-protector, do not add any canary onto any functions
-fstack-protector, only add the canary onto a few functions in compile time
-fstack-protector-all, add the canary onto all functions, be cautions about this one. It’d be triggered the heavily performance hit.
-fstack-protector-strong, add the canary onto those functions, which the stack buffers would be used. This is a smart one. But its only supported by GCC 4.9.x. Kees Cook shared a very good writing here:
http://www.outflux.net/blog/archives/2014/01/27/fstack-protector-strong/

Check the symbols in an elf file:

#readelf -s ./a.out | grep stack_chk_fail
3: 0000000000000000 0 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT UND __stack_chk_fail@GLIBC_2.4 (3)
52: 0000000000000000 0 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT UND __stack_chk_fail@@GLIBC_2

*) RELRO

RELocation Read-Only.
Turn it on: -z norelro
Turn it off: -z now
Check elf header to find partial-RELRO:

shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ readelf -l a.out | grep GNU_RELRO
GNU_RELRO 0x0000000000000e28 0x0000000000600e28 0x0000000000600e28

Check elf’s dynamic sections to find fully-RELRO:

shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ readelf -d a.out | grep BIND_NOW
0x0000000000000018 (BIND_NOW)

*) PIE

PIE enforces every process’s code segment is mmap()‘d, it begins at a different base address at each execution of the application. Note: mmap()’ is always used no matter what the type of the executable is (PIE vs. non-PIE).For non-PIE binaries the kernel uses an internal flag equivalent to MMAP_FIXED when mapping program headers.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Position-independent_code

GCC option: -pie, it only work for sec mitigation when kernel enables ASLR.

no PIE:

shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ readelf -h a.out | grep "Type:[[:space:]]*EXEC"
Type: EXEC (Executable file)

PIE:

shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ readelf -h a.out | grep "Type:[[:space:]]*DYN"
Type: DYN (Shared object file)

These exploit mitigations provided by GCC will definitely increase the cost of attackers. We all did believed so…until shit happened( as always?). Hector Marco released a method:
http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html

that can bypass NX/ASLR/PIE/CANARY mitigations locally/remotely easily. After these years of debating and bragging about how secure of GNU/Linux is/was and we finally ended up in*One mem infoleak can rule the fuc*ing GNU/Linux*!!! Damn, PaX/Grsecurity will be our last hope again, like a decade ago………..

---- [ 2.2 0ld sch00l *nix file auditing

There are a bunch of files that could be exploited by attackers in the specific scene. Fortunately, FOSS( Free & Open Source) community is providing a lot of methods for the security audit work. They should be a defender’s daily bread, which being part of defense-in-depth model. WildCards is a powerful feature in UNIX-like platform, but it can be exploited by attackers:
http://www.defensecode.com/public/DefenseCode_Unix_WildCards_Gone_Wild.txt

find / -path /proc -prune  -name "-*"

World-writable file audit

find / -path /proc -prune -o -perm -2 ! -type l -ls

World-readable file audit, correct permission: chmod 640 /var/log/

find /var/log -perm -o=r ! -type l

Check if files were orphange

find / -path /proc -prune -o -nouser -o -nogroup

List avaiable users, be cautions about who’s the “user”

egrep -v '.*:\*|:\!' /etc/shadow | awk -F: '{print $1}'

Check which files belong to whom. Then delete the user correctly:

#userdel -r account
find / -path /proc -prune -o -user account -ls

List which users are unavailable

grep -v ':x:' /etc/passwd

List expired passwords

cat /etc/shadow | cut -d: -f 1,2 | grep '!'

The correct permission should be 644 at least. 600 would be better.

ls -l /boot

Files with suid or sgid flags

find / -xdev -user root \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \)

Check if some stupid mistakes has been made( Thanks to Tim Brown).

objdump -x $i | grep -i path

Note: The main stream GNU/Linux distro( Debian, Gentoo, OpenSUSE, CentOS) won’t have big chance to do stupid things, but it’s worth to look at GNU/Linux platform with 3-rd party applications. Some commercial applications may do something stuipid like this one:

http://lists.openwall.net/bugtraq/2014/06/04/5

---- [ 2.3 GNU/Linux’s auditd

One particular scene is that some m41wares( or human attackers) might be interested in change some file’s metadata for some *interesting* reasons and then change it back to the original. Let’s show time:

Install auditd and make sure its on boot startup:

#apt-get install auditd
#update-rc.d auditd enable

Config file:

/etc/audit/auditd.conf

Store log file:

log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log

Add one policy to /etc/audit/audit.rules:

-w /home/shawn/change-test -p wa -k  identify

Use this test program to change the permission:

#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	struct stat sb;

	if( stat(argv[1], &sb) == -1){
	    perror("stat");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
		}

		if( chmod(argv[1], sb.st_mode) == -1)
		{
			perror("stat");
				exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
				}
				return ;
}

shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ gcc change.c
shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ touch change-test
shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ ./a.out change-test

The date of “Modify” and “Change” should be different:

shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ stat change-test

Check *who* did it:

shawn@shawn-fortress ~ $ ausearch -i -k identify

---- [ 2.4 T00ls

NMAP/OpenVAS/lynis/rkhunter/chkrootkit/metasploit/volatality/etc

-- [ 3. Kernel security

Anti-DoS related:

** SYN cookies is a syn flood attack protection, the default is enable( 1):

net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies

(optional),if your kernel support SYNPROXY:

iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 --syn -j NOTRACK
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 -m state UNTRACKED,INVALID \
	 -j SYNPROXY --sack-perm --timestamp --mss 1480 --wscale 7 --ecn
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose

Note: SYNPROXY has been added into vanilla kernel in 3.13.

** TCP FIN-WAIT-2 status reversed time, it’d be an DoS attack risk if the value is too big. It’d be cause remote machine doesn’t have enough time to close the connection if the value is too small. Default is 60( seconds). 15 is better, you think? Further reading:

http://benohead.com/tcp-about-fin_wait_2-time_wait-and-close_wait/

net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 15
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fin_timeout

** SYN queue length, the bigger value can handle more connections, the default is 1024:

net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 8192
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_syn_backlog

** Device queue length, this value should be bigger than syn queue? The default is 1000

net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 16384
/proc/sys/net/core/netdev_max_backlog

** listen()’s backlog, the default is 128:

net.core.somaxconn = 4096
/proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn

** TIME_WAIT status TCP connections, the system will empty the connection if the number is exceed the value,

net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets = 65535
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_tw_buckets

** TIME-WAIT status can be reuse, the default is disable( 0):

net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 1
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tw_reuse

** fast recycle of TIME-WAIT status connection, the default is disable( 0):

net.ipv4.tcp_tw_recycle = 1
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tw_recycle

** TCP KEEPALIVE probe frequency,the default is 7,200 seconds:

net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 300
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_keepalive_time

** TCP KEEPALIVE probe packets, the default is 9:

net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes = 3
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_keepalive_probes

** how many times of SYN and SYN+ACK can be re-transimit, the default is 5:

net.ipv4.tcp_syn_retries = 3
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syn_retries
net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3 
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_synack_retries

** the bigger value of TCP ORPHAN would prevent simple DoS attack, each ORPHAN cost 64KB memory, so 65535 is about 4GB:

net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans = 65536
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_orphans

** How many pages( 4KB each page in x86) can be used in TCP connection:

net.ipv4.tcp_mem = 131072 196608 262144
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem

Be careful about this one, it’d be triggered OOM if the TCP connection consume all pages.

** The maxisum send and receive window, you can set 64MB for a 10G NIC:

net.core.rmem_max = 67108864
/proc/sys/net/core/rmem_max
net.core.wmem_max = 67108864
/proc/sys/net/core/wmem_max

** Each TCP connection’s read buffer( X bytes):

net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 8192 16777216( 4096 87380 33554432)
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_rmem
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 8192 16777216( 4096 65536 33554432)
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_wmem

If default paging 8kb * 2 = 16kb/connection, 4GB memory can be used for: (4 * 1024 * 1024) / 16 = 262144

Oracle DB server’s best practice:
http://www.dba-oracle.com/t_linux_networking_kernel_parameters.htm


Networking

Ref: https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles11/singlehtml/book_hardening/book_hardening.html

** Source Routing is used to specify a path or route through the network from source to destination. This feature can be used by network people for diagnosing problems. However, if an intruder was able to send a source routed packet into the network, then he could intercept the replies and your server might not know that it’s not communicating with a trusted server.

net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_source_route

** ICMP redirects are used by routers to tell the server that there is a better path to other networks than the one chosen by the server. However, an intruder could potentially use ICMP redirect packets to alter the hosts’s routing table by causing traffic to use a path you didn’t intend.

net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects

** Turn it off if this is not a router:

net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0

** IP spoofing protection, the default is disabled( 0):

net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter

** If you want to ignore all ICMP package, you can enable it. The default is disabled( 0):

net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all = 1
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all

** Ignore ICMP broadcast, the default is enabled( 1):

net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts

** To alert you about bad message, the default is disabled( 1):

net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses

** To turn on logging for Spoofed Packets, Source Routed Packets, and Redirect Packets, the default is disabled( 0):

/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1

Exploit mitigation

** Randomize the memory area. 0: disable ASLR. 1: Randomize the stack, VDSO page, shared memory regions. 2: (1) + also randomize the data segment.

kernel.randomize_va_space=2
/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space

** Not allow the user to read kernel address symbol tables:

kernel.kptr_restrict=1
/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict

** the minimal memory map address, 65536 is good at least:

vm.mmap_min_addr=65536
/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr

** Now allow the debugger trace the process by ptrace. The current Debian stable kernel doesn’t have this feature. 0: All process can be debugged. 1: Only one father process can be debugged. 2: Only root can do debug( with CAP_SYS_PTRACE) 3: no process can be debugged

kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 2
/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope

---- [ 3.1 Apparmor

Why Apparmor? It’s easy to deploy. More importantly, it’s easy to audit the polices. Everyone can write your own MAC/RBAC policy. Debian/OpenSuSE shipped with Apparmor by default.

Install Apparmor and MAC polices from community:

#apt-get install -y apparmor-profiles apparmor

Check the status:

#aa-status

—-[ 3.2 SELinux

S0rry. I barely use SELinux for reasons. The 1st one is I don’t trust NSA, even the source code is GPL’ed. NSA is professional about *implant* backdoors, which would be very hard to audit. People has been discussing it for years:

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/04/nsas_linux.html

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-07-09/nsa-has-inserted-its-code-android-os-bugging-three-quarters-all-smartphones

http://www.eteknix.com/nsa-has-code-running-in-the-linux-kernel-and-android/

Sebastian Krahmer found a exploitable bug from SELinux recently:

https://github.com/stealth/troubleshooter

It looks like a backdoor more than a “vulnerablity”, isn’t it?;-)

Another important reason people don’t like SELinux because it’s hard to use and cause other application troubles from time to time. “Stop disabling SELinux” movement won’t work in the near future:

http://stopdisablingselinux.com/

S0rry, Mr.Walsh. It’s nothing personal:-)

---- [ 3.3 Mempo kernel

“⌘ Mempo project aims to provide most secure and yet comfortable out-of-the-box Desktop and Server computer, for professionals, business, journalists, and every-day users avoiding PRISM-like spying. ⌘”

https://wiki.debian.org/Mempo

Mempo is a FLOSS project for protect user’s digital freedom. Let the massive surveillance cry;-)

The Debian Mempo repo is not working for the internet user now and it’ll be back soon. So I’ll write how to use PaX/Grsecurity from offical Mempo repository on Debian.

---- [ 3.3.1 PaX/Grsecurity

PaX/Grsecurity is the cutting-edge kernel protection in past 14 years. But they don’t have the credit what they supposed to have. Almost every main stream OS kernel security mechanism has influenced by PaX/Grsecurity in past decade. Lionel tells a little story about PaX/Grsecurity better than myself:

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/12/06/14

PaX/Grsecurity treat the kernel security as a whole. They’ve been inventing many innovations( SEGMEXEC, PAGEEXEC, MPROTECT, UDEREF, RANDSTRUCT*, etc), while hardening the kernel in source code level( make important *struct* read-only, etc). PaX/Grsecurity is one of most respected 0ld sch00l hacker community. The main contributor( Spender) was even been through a very badly economic situation back in 2004:

http://developers.slashdot.org/story/04/05/31/1949241/end-of-development-for-grsecurity-announced

Thanks to the G0d of techn0logy, PaX/Grsecurity is still alive…. I personally agree with some ideas:


“The “better than none” point of view is actually a nice way to false sense of security for those who don’t know better. We got better-than-none apparmor, selinux, tomoyo, some poorly maintained and crippled ports of grsec features or alikes, namespaces and containers, rootkit-friendly LSM, the dumb and useless kernel version of SSP, etc. What’s the sum of all this shit for end users? False sense of security…“

“without Grsecurity/PaX, linux security is like monkey can never perform a regular masturbation cu’z lacking of giant pennis;-)”


Too many better-than-none product or solutions, which only makes you feel safe, maybe for a while. Feel safe is not equal to secure. Fuc*ing cargo cult shitty security only makes things worse.

I’ll show you how to install PaX/Grsecurity manually( still waiting Mempo back online):

** Download kernel( Pick one): https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/

** Download PaX/Grsecurity patch( you can download the latest version from ):

https://grsecurity.net/download.php

** Decompress the kernel and patch the kernel with grsecurity:

xz -d linux-*.tar.xz
tar xvf linux-*.tar
cd linux-*/
patch -p1 < ../grsecurity-*.patch

** Do “make menuconfig” to customize your kernel, or you can use my test config:

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/citypw/citypw-SCFE/master/security/apparmor_test/debian-7.4-linux-3.14.1-grsec.config

** Compile

make -j7 deb-pkg

** Install the new kernel

dpkg -i ../*.deb

-- [ 4. Crypto

“Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on. Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrifically weak that NSA can frequently find ways around it.” — Edward Snowden

---- [ 4.1 SSL/TLS Checklist

Very good writing:

http://www.exploresecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/custom/SSL_manual_cheatsheet.html

SSL/TLS has been through BEAST/CRIME/LUCKY-13/HEARTBLEED/POODLE in past few years.


SSLv2 should be disabled:

openssl s_client -ssl2 -connect www.google.com:443

OpenSSL 1.0 no longer support SSLv2. So you can use GnuTLS do the check:

gnutls-cli -d 5 -p 443 --priority "NORMAL:-VERS-TLS1.2:-VERS-TLS1.1:-VERS-TLS1.0:-VERS-SSL3.0" www.google.com

FREAK:

openssl s_client -cipher EXPORT -connect www.google.com:443

If succeed, it’s risk to FREAK.


---- [ 4.2 OpenSSH

Config file:/etc/ssh/ssh_config

1, known_hosts stores server’s signature, so hash the host name:

HashKnownHosts yes

2, SSH protocl version 1 is not secure:

Protocol 2

3, If you don’t use X11 forwarding, plz disable it”

X11Forwarding no

4, Disable rhosts:

IgnoreRhosts yes

5, Not allow empty password:

PermitEmptyPasswords no

6, Maxisum tries:

MaxAuthTries 5

7, Now allow root login:

PermitRootLogin no

(Optional)

1, disable password auth, enable pubkey auth:

PubkeyAuthentication yes
PasswordAuthentication no

2,Allow or deny users/groups

AllowGroups, AllowUsers, DenyUsers, DenyGroups

------ [ 4.2.1 OpenSSH in post-prism era

Well, plz read this:

https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html

---- [ 4.2 Ciphersuites in Apache2/Nginx

Apache:

SSLProtocol ALL -SSLv2 -SSLv3
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDH+AESGCM:DH+AESGCM:ECDH+AES256:DH+AES256:ECDH+AES128:DH+AES:ECDH+3DES:DH+3DES:RSA+AESGCM:RSA+AES:RSA+3DES:!aNULL:!MD5:!DSS

Nginx:

ssl_prefer_server_ciphers On;
ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2;
ssl_ciphers ECDH+AESGCM:DH+AESGCM:ECDH+AES256:DH+AES256:ECDH+AES128:DH+AES:ECDH+3DES:DH+3DES:RSA+AESGCM:RSA+AES:RSA+3DES:!aNULL:!MD5:!DSS

-- [ 5. Reference

[1] Back To The Future: Unix Wildcards Gone Wild
http://www.defensecode.com/public/DefenseCode_Unix_WildCards_Gone_Wild.txt

[2] SYNPROXY
http://lwn.net/Articles/563151/

[3] DDoS protection Using Netfilter/iptables
http://people.netfilter.org/hawk/presentations/devconf2014/iptables-ddos-mitigation_JesperBrouer.pdf

[4] INTERNET PROTOCOL
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc791

[5] A simple TCP spoofing attack
http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/papers/secnet-spoof.txt

[6] ICMP Attacks Illustrated
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/threats/icmp-attacks-illustrated-477

[7] SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 SP3 - Security and Hardening
https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles11/singlehtml/book_hardening/book_hardening.html

[8] Securing Debian Manual
https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-howto/

[9] A Brief Introduction to auditd
http://security.blogoverflow.com/2013/01/a-brief-introduction-to-auditd/

[10] Apparmor RBAC
http://wiki.apparmor.net/index.php/Pam_apparmor_example

[11] Hardening PHP from php.ini
http://www.madirish.net/199

[12] CVE-2014-0196 exploit
http://bugfuzz.com/stuff/cve-2014-0196-md.c

[13] Secure Secure Shell
https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html

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